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Abstract 
 
Safety and security are highly related concepts [1] 
[2] [3].  Both deal with the protection of valuable 
assets from harm, and both do this by avoiding, 
detecting, and responding to incidents that can cause 
such harm.  In both cases, the dangers (hazards and 
threats respectively) that can cause or enable such 
incidents to occur are identified and the associated 
risks are analyzed in order to ensure that these risks 
are mitigated to acceptable levels. 
Safety engineering is typically concerned less with 
requirements than with its downstream activities (e.g., 
architecting, design, coding, testing) because much of 
hazard analysis is based on the existence of an 
architecture, the components of which can cause 
accidents if they fail.  Yet one central safety 
engineering technique is to categorize the system 
requirements based on their safety significance and 
use this categorization to determine the associated 
level of development processes necessary to assure a 
corresponding acceptable level of safety risk. 
Based on the similarity between safety and security, 
this position paper advocates using a similar process 
to categorize the security significance of non-security 
requirements and use this information to ensure that 
an adequate development process is used to assure an 
acceptable level of security risk.   
 
1. Introduction 
Although engineering security requirements is a very 
significant task [4], this paper deals instead with the 
security aspects of the other requirements of a system: 
the non-security requirements.  Some functional, data, 
interface, and quality (e.g., interoperability, 
performance) requirements clearly have significant 
security ramifications, whereas others do not.  For 
example, some requirements may address the storing 
and manipulation of sensitive information, whereas 
other requirements may address the display of publicly 
accessible information of relatively little importance.  
Clearly from a security standpoint, it is more important 
to properly implement those requirements with major 
security ramifications than it is to implement those 
requirements with little or no security significance.  
The safety community has developed a standard 
approach to solving this problem of requirements 
relevance, and the similarity between safety and 
security implies that it would be well worth 
considering if something similar can be done for 
security. 
The next section of this position paper briefly 
points out the many similarities between safety and 
security.  The third section describes how a safety 
(hazard) analysis is commonly used to categorize 
requirements so that the limited project resources are 
concentrated on properly implementing the most 
“safety-critical” requirements.  The fourth section 
proposes the use of an analogous approach for 
categorizing requirements in terms of their security 
ramifications.  The fifth section discusses other related 
approaches.  The final section raises questions to be 
considered by security engineers concerning adapting 
these safety concepts and techniques to security and 
suggest certain benefits that may result if they do. 
 
2. Similarities between Safety and Security 
 
Safety and security are closely related quality 
factors in a system’s quality model because they both 
describe important related attributes or characteristics 
of the system’s overall quality [1] [2] [3].  Safety and 
security are subtypes of defensibility quality factor 
because they are both primarily concerned with the 
protection of valuable assets (e.g., people, property, 
services, and the environment) from harm (i.e., 
significant negative consequences).  As illustrated in 
figure 1, the essential difference between safety and 
security is that safety deals with accidental harm, 
whereas security deals with malicious harm, which is 
harm resulting from attacks or probes by someone or 
something (e.g., viruses) playing the role of attacker. 
This harm to valuable assets occurs during 
incidents, which are unplanned, unintended, 
unauthorized, (but not necessarily unexpected) events 
or series of related events that could cause unintended 
harm to one or more valuable assets.  Safety incidents 
are either accidents (harm occurs) or near misses, 
whereas security incidents are successful attacks (harm 
occurs), unsuccessful attacks (harm does not occur), 
and probes (i.e., preparations for attacks). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Types of Harm to Valuable Assets 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Types of Incidents 
In order to prevent these undesired incidents, one 
typically begins by identifying the dangers that can 
cause them.  Specifically, a danger is one or more 
conditions, situations, or states of a system that in 
conjunction with conditions in the environment of the 
system can cause or contribute to the occurrence of 
one or more related incidents.  As illustrated in figure 
3, dangers are classified into hazards (which can cause 
safety incidents) and threats, which can cause security 
incidents or survivability incidents (e.g., military 
attacks). 
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Figure 3: Types of Dangers 
 
One reason that dangers are analyzed (e.g., via 
hazard analysis or threat analysis) is to determine the 
associated risks so that risk mitigation can occur.  Risk 
is usually defined as the probable magnitude of the 
potential harm to one or more assets that can occur due 
to a danger and is conservatively estimated as the 
maximum credible harm multiplied by the estimated 
probability that the associated accident / successful 
attack occurs.  And as before, risks can be classified as 
safety risks due to hazards, security risks due to 
security threats, and [military] survivability risks. 
Once the system is [partially] implemented, it may 
have vulnerabilities (e.g., a lack of input validation) 
that can cause both accidents as well as enable 
successful attacks.  Occasionally, the same controls 
used to overcome these vulnerabilities can work as 
safeguards (safety), countermeasures (security), and 
defenses (survivability).  Finally, the safety engineers 
on an endeavor construct a safety case [5], which 
documents their: 
• Claims that the system is adequately safe (i.e., 
meets its safety requirements) 
• Arguments for their claims of adequate safety. 
• Compelling evidence backing up their arguments. 
• Any assumptions on which their arguments may 
be based. 
 
3. Safety Analysis and Categorization 
 
Safety engineers typically perform the following 
types of safety analyses: 
• Asset analysis to determine which assets are 
valuable to legitimate stakeholders and how 
valuable they are. 
• Harm analysis to determine the credible types and 
severities of the accidental harm that can occur to 
these assets, whereby harm severities are typically 
categories of the magnitude of harm. 
• Incident analysis to determine the kinds of 
accidents that can cause harm to the assets as well 
as the kinds of near misses that need to be 
addressed. 
• Hazard analysis to determine the hazards (i.e., 
hazardous conditions) that can lead to safety 
incidents as well as their causes and consequences.  
Note that the phrase “hazard analysis” is typically 
used to refer to the union of all of these different 
types of safety analysis. 
• Risk analysis to categorize the safety incidents and 
hazards by levels of safety risk, such as 
intolerable, undesirable, as low as reasonably 
practical (ALARP), and acceptable. 
Once safety risks have been identified and 
categorized, safety engineers use the results of these 
analyses to assign corresponding: 
• Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) to individual 
requirements or collections of related 
requirements. 
• Safety Evidence Assurance Levels (SEALs) to the 
associated architectural, design, and code 
components that implement these requirements.  
Figure 4 shows an example categorization of harm 
severity, incident/hazard occurrence frequency, and 
resulting safety risks / safety integrity levels.  For 
example, an accident with catastrophic consequences 
that is estimated to occur frequently would have an 
intolerable safety risk.  Any requirement (or set of 
related requirements that would cause such a safety 
risk would have an intolerable risk, an associated SIL 
value of 4, and have to be either changed to lower the 
risk or else dropped as a requirement.  On the other 
had, a requirement that could result in a remote chance 
of causing a critical accident would be assigned a SIL 
value of 2, which means that steps would need to be 
taken (e.g., architectural decisions, coding standards) 
to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practical 
(ALARP).  Finally, any requirement that only has a 
remote chance of causing an accident, the severity of 
which is negligible would have a SIL value of 1, 
meaning that the safety risk is acceptable and that no 
extra steps would need to be taken to reduce the risk. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Safety Risk Categorization Matrix 
 
As mentioned previously, corresponding to each 
safety risk and requirements safety integrity level 
would be a corresponding safety evidence assurance 
level (SEAL) that would determine both the extra 
measures that would need to be taken to assure 
acceptable safety as well as the associated evidence 
that would need to be collected to support the safety 
certification (e.g., flight certification) of the system.  
For example, these measures could include anything 
from the formal specification of the requirements and 
formal proofs of correctness of the resulting design 
and implementation to the use of Fagan inspections, a 
safe subset of the programming language, and specific 
types of testing and test completeness criteria. 
 
4. Security Analysis and Categorization 
 
A complete security analysis is a valuable part of 
managing security risks [6] [7].  As with safety, 
security analysis should include: 
• Asset analysis to determine the assets that are 
sufficiently valuable to legitimate stakeholders to 
be worth protecting from attackers. 
• Harm analysis to determine the types and 
severities of the malicious harm that can occur to 
these assets so that the level of investment in 
security countermeasures will be commensurate 
with the value of the assets being protected. 
• Incident analysis to determine the kinds of 
security attacks that could cause malicious harm as 
well as the kinds of probes to be addressed. 
• Threat analysis to determine the threats (i.e., 
threatening conditions) that can lead to security 
incidents.  Because security involves attacks, these 
threats can be considered to be the existence of 
attackers with specific profiles (e.g., means, 
motive, and opportunity) or the proactive tools of 
their trade (e.g., viruses and worms). 
• Risk analysis to categorize the security incidents 
and threats by levels of security risk, such as 
intolerable, undesirable, as low as reasonably 
practical (ALARP), and acceptable. 
Security engineers usually specify general kinds of 
security goals regarding confidentiality, integrity, non-
reputability of transactions, and availability in the face 
of denial of service (DoS) attacks.  They also rely on 
implementing industry best practices such as the use of 
standard countermeasures (e.g., firewalls, encryption) 
and performing security testing (e.g., penetration tests). 
But given the similarity between safety and 
security, security engineers should consider taking the 
following steps to better address security engineering 
during requirements engineering: 
1. Security Analysis.  Perform security analysis early 
in the development cycle when it can still 
influence the requirements.  Include asset analysis, 
harm analysis, threat analysis, and risk analysis. 
2. Security Risk Categorization Matrix.  Group 
potential malicious harm severities and potential 
frequencies of successful attacks and threat 
occurrences into meaningful categories.  Use these 
to develop a security risk categorization matrix 
similar to a safety risk categorization matrix in 
figure 4. 
3. Security Importance Levels (SILs).  Group security 
risk categorization matrix cells having similar 
levels of security risk into security risk categories.  
Use this categorization to formally define the 
endeavor’s security importance levels (SILs). Note 
that the use of the analogous phrase “security 
integrity levels” is not recommended because 
integrity has a specialized meaning within the 
security discipline. 
4. Security Evidence Assurance Levels (SEALs). For 
each security SIL, define a corresponding security 
SEAL in terms of the best industry practices that 
should be followed to protect valuable assets from 
attack.  These mandated practices will include 
both countermeasures (e.g., the use of firewalls 
and more secure coding standards) that are very 
general in that they provide widespread protection, 
as well as other more selective countermeasures 
(e.g., encryption) that will directly apply to 
smaller numbers of requirements.   Although most 
of the measures mandated by these security 
SEALs will tend to be architecture-level 
countermeasures, the highest SEALs may also 
include the mandate to expend more resources 
during requirements engineering.  For example, 
the highest SEALs may mandate the generation of 
pure security requirements associated with the 
non-security requirements as well as mandate the 
formal specification of such high SIL non-security 
requirements to ensure that they are complete and 
unambiguous. 
5. Requirements Risks.  Use the results of the 
preceding security analysis and the security risk 
categorization matrix to estimate the potential 
security risks associated with the non-security 
requirements, considering both individual 
requirements and where practical collections of 
related requirements.  For each [group of] non-
security requirements, assign an appropriate 
security SIL by considering all types of: 
• Valuable assets needing to be protected that 
are mentioned within the requirement. 
• Harm that can occur to these assets due to 
attacks, especially if the requirement is not 
implemented correctly, thereby creating an 
associated vulnerability.  Consider the loss of 
confidentiality including both privacy and 
anonymity.  Consider the loss of integrity of 
data, communication, software (e.g., via 
viruses and worms), hardware (e.g., via 
tampering), and people (e.g., via corruption 
and bribery).  Consider the loss of availability 
of data access and services.  Finally, consider 
any need to avoid repudiation of transactions. 
• Security incidents (attacks and probes) that 
could be used to attack the assets and cause 
malicious harm. 
When categorizing the non-security requirements 
by SIL, use any mention of users (e.g., as actors in 
use case models) and interface requirements to 
help identify requirements that will require 
derived identification, authentication, and 
authorization requirements.  
6. Requirements Implementation.  Use the SILs when 
tracing the requirements to architectural, design, 
and implementation components so that the 
appropriate level of process and best industry 
practices can be used to both properly implement 
the requirements and generate useful evidence for 
security certification purposes. 
7. Security Case.  Use the evidence resulting from 
applying the appropriate SEALs to provide useful 
arguments and evidence to build a security case 
that is similar to a safety case. 
 
5. Related Work 
 
Some of the similarities between safety and security 
have prompted others to recommend the use of safety 
techniques when performing security engineering. 
Sacha Brostoff and M. Angela note that safety and 
security are perceived by many people as expensive 
activities that are only critical when they fail [2]. When 
accidents and successful attacks finally occur, the last 
individual in the chain of events leading up to the 
incident is often made a scapegoat when blame can be 
spread across multiple people and processes.  They 
therefore recommend using the Generic Error 
Modeling System (GEMS) for analyzing these 
individual and organization sources of failures [8].  
This work, however, does not address similarities 
between safety and security requirements, but rather 
the causal chains of events that lead to accidents and 
successful attacks. 
Nancy Leveson and Mats Heimdahl also recognize 
many similarities between safety and security [3].  
Based on these similarities, they recommend using the 
safety engineering techniques Intent Specifications [9] 
and Software Deviation Analysis (SDA) when 
performing security engineering.  Intent specifications 
are a way of organizing project documentation, and 
level 1 (of 7) includes formally-specified requirements. 
SDA takes these formally specified requirements as an 
input and therefore is not relevant to categorizing 
security requirements.  They do not address the 
security relevance of non-security requirements.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The contents of this position paper are heavily 
based on the strong similarity between the concepts 
and associated analyses underlying safety and security 
engineering.  Safety engineering categorizes non-
safety requirements using safety integrity levels (SILs), 
uses safety evidence assurance levels (SEALs) to 
enforce the additional measures needed to develop the 
more safety-critical parts of systems and to ensure the 
existence of the documentation needed to build safety 
cases and obtain safety certification.  This paper 
suggests that security engineers should consider doing 
the same by: 
• Using security importance levels (SILs) for 
categorizing non-security requirements in terms of 
their security relevance. 
• Using security evidence assurance levels (SEALs) 
to enforce the additional measures needed to 
develop the more security-critical parts of systems 
and to ensure the existence of the documentation 
needed for security certification. 
• Using security SILs and SEALs to build security 
cases. 
Safety and security engineering are typically 
considered to be separate specialty engineering 
disciplines, and these disciplines are therefore usually 
not well integrated with mainstream engineering 
disciplines such as requirements engineering, 
architecting, design, implementation, and testing.  
Thus, safety and security policies are sometimes under 
emphasized during architecting because they do not 
adequately affect the requirements specifications.  But 
safety engineers have increased safety engineering’s 
influence early in the development cycle by using 
safety SILs and SEALs. It is possible that the use of 
security SILs and SEALs could similarly be a way to: 
• Enable security engineers to prioritize the 
requirements so that they can concentrate their 
limited resources on the most important 
requirements and their implementations  
• Better integrate security engineering into 
requirements engineering and architecting. 
• Ensure that security is better addressed early in the 
development cycle before the architecture is 
largely completed and frozen. 
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